This study examines the sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations and whether credit rating agencies and the bond market differ in their perceptions of this risk. Measuring credit risk using credit ratings, we find that credit risk is positively related to the securitizing firm's retained interest in the securitized assets and unrelated to the portion of the securitized assets not retained by the firm. However, we only find evidence of a relation with retained interest for one type of asset-residential mortgages. These findings support critics' allegations that rating agencies largely ignore asset securitizations when developing credit ratings, but suggest that when they do consider securitizations, they view them as asset sales. Measuring credit risk using bond spreads, we find that credit risk is positively related to both the firm's retained interest in the assets and the portion of the securitized assets not retained by the firm. The findings indicate that the bond market does not distinguish between the retained and nonretained portions of the securitized assets, suggesting the bond market views asset securitizations as secured borrowings. We find evidence of these relations regardless of the type of asset securitized. These disparate views of the sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations provide insight into the ongoing controversies surrounding both the accounting treatment of asset securitizations and the efficacy of credit ratings.
Introduction
This study seeks to determine the sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations and whether credit rating agencies and the bond market differ in their perception of the sources of this risk. We focus on credit risk because the transfer of credit risk is a key motivation for asset securitizations and it raises difficult accounting issues. By addressing whether perceptions of credit risk differ for credit rating agencies and the bond market, we provide evidence on critics' allegations that rating agencies were not diligent in assessing the effects of "off-balance sheet" activities, particularly asset securitizations, when developing credit ratings. We find that asset securitizations are positively associated with the securitizing firm's credit risk, but credit rating agencies and the bond market differ in their perception of the sources of this risk.
In a typical securitization transaction, a firm transfers assets to a special purpose securitization entity (SPE) and, in exchange, receives cash obtained from other investors in the SPE and a retained interest in the transferred assets. 1 Because the firm's continuing involvement with the securitized assets can be complex, it is not straightforward to determine whether all of the risk of the assets resides with the SPE, all of the risk of the assets resides with the firm, or whether some of the risk of the assets resides with the SPE and some with the firm.
1 Although, typically, the retained interest is the firm's interest in the SPE, effectively it is the firm's interest in the securitized assets. We use the terms "interest retained by the firm" and "retained interest" to refer to the firm's retained interest in the securitized assets. We use the terms "interest retained by the SPE" and "SPE's retained interest" to refer to the interest in the securitized assets retained by the SPE's other investors, i.e., the portion of securitized assets not retained by the firm. The sum of these interests is the total amount of assets securitized, i.e., "total securitized assets." In addition, when we refer to the question of whether the risk of the securitized assets resides with the SPE or with the firm, we are referring to the portion of the securitized assets not retained by the firm.
Consistent with this lack of clarity, there is an ongoing debate regarding the appropriate accounting treatment for asset securitizations. Accounting standards relating to asset securitizations specify conditions that must be met for a securitization transaction to be treated as a sale. Under the current accounting rules, for a securitization to receive sale treatment, the risk of the assets must be completely transferred to the SPE. If the risk transfer is incomplete, i.e., some or all of the risk resides with the securitizing firm, the securitization is treated as secured borrowing. Recently, however, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have revisited the accounting for securitizations because the boards believe it is not always clear whether transfers of assets, particularly to securitization entities, are sales or borrowings, and whether such a distinction faithfully represents the economics of the transactions (FASB, 2009; IASB, 2009) . We provide insight into the ongoing financial reporting controversy relating to asset securitizations by providing evidence on the extent to which securitized assets are associated with the firm's credit risk, and whether credit market participants view securitizations as sales or borrowings.
Our tests focus on the relation between two measures of credit risk-credit ratings and bond spreads-and accounting amounts related to asset securitizations of bank holding companies. We focus on banks because they are the largest group of asset securitizers and data on their securitizations are available from the Federal Reserve. Using both credit ratings and bond spreads enables us to provide evidence on whether the perceptions of the sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations differ for two key credit market participants.
Comparing the results from the two sets of tests provides insight into allegations that credit rating agencies were not diligent in assessing the effects of securitizations on credit risk.
We estimate the relation between the firm's credit risk and both total securitized assets and the firm's retained interest in the securitized assets. We first use credit ratings as the measure of credit risk. If rating agencies perceive that the firm does not bear the risk of the assets transferred to the SPE and only bears the risk of its retained interest, we expect to observe no relation between credit ratings and total securitized assets and a positive incremental relation between credit ratings and the firm's retained interest. Such a finding is consistent with credit rating agencies viewing securitizations as asset sales. This could be the case, for example, if rating agencies view the SPE as separate from the firm, i.e., as bankruptcy remote. If, instead, credit rating agencies perceive that the firm bears risk associated with assets transferred to the SPE, we expect to observe a positive relation between credit ratings and total securitized assets.
Such a finding indicates that rating agencies view both the retained and non-retained portions of the securitized assets as relevant to the firm's credit risk. Finding, both a positive relation between credit ratings and total securitized assets and no incremental relation for the firm's retained interest indicates that rating agencies do not distinguish between the retained and nonretained portions when assessing the firm's credit risk. Such a finding is consistent with rating agencies viewing asset securitizations as secured borrowings. We then use bond spreads as the measure of credit risk, and interpret the findings from this relation in the same way as we interpret the credit rating relation.
We find evidence that credit rating agencies perceive that the firm only bears credit risk associated with its retained interest in the securitized assets, not in the non-retained portion of the assets. In particular, we find that credit ratings are not significantly related to total securitized assets and are significantly positively related to the firm's retained interest. These findings differ from the findings of prior research on the equity market's perception of the sources of risk from asset securitizations, which generally concludes that the firm bears risk associated with both the retained and non-retained portions of securitized assets.
In contrast to the credit rating results, but consistent with prior equity market research, we find evidence that the bond market perceives that the firm bears credit risk associated with both the retained and non-retained portions of securitized assets. In particular, we find that bond spreads are significantly positively related to total securitized assets. In addition, we find that bond spreads are not incrementally related to the firm's retained interest, which indicates the bond market perceives the retained and non-retained portions of the assets as equally relevant for assessing credit risk.
In additional analyses, we test whether the association between the firm's credit risk and asset securitizations varies with the type of asset securitized. Following prior research, we partition securitized assets into residential mortgages, consumer loans, and commercial loans.
Regarding credit ratings, we find that the insignificant relation between total securitized assets and credit ratings also is evident regardless of the type of asset securitized. However, we find that the significant relation between credit ratings and retained interest is attributable to only one type of securitized asset-residential mortgages. Regarding bond spreads, we find that the significant relation between total securitized assets and the insignificant incremental relation with the firm's retained interest and bond spreads is evident regardless of the type of asset securitized.
Credit ratings represent rating agencies' assessment of the bank's credit risk. Thus, credit ratings can reflect rating agencies' private information about asset securitizations, but can be influenced by factors other than the credit risk of the bank, such as rating agency incentives for issuing particular ratings. Bond spreads represent an assessment of credit risk aggregated across bond-market participants. Thus, bond spreads reflect publicly available information about asset securitizations, which might be incomplete, but likely are not influenced by credit rating agency incentives for assessing a particular level of risk. If one's priors result in placing more weight on assessments by the bond market than on those by rating agencies, then, taken together, our findings call into question not only the appropriateness of treating asset securitizations as sales, but also the diligence of credit rating agencies in assessing credit risk associated with off-balance sheet securitization activities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the background and motivation for the study, and section 3 discuses related research. Section 4 describes the basis for our predictions and research design. Section 5 describes the sample selection. Section 6 presents the primary findings and results from additional analyses, and section 7 offers concluding remarks.
Background on Securitizations

What is an Asset Securitization?
In an asset securitization, the securitizing firm transfers some of its assets, e.g., consumer loans, to a special purpose entity (SPE). In return, the SPE transfers to the securitizing firm an interest in the SPE and cash that the SPE obtains from outside investors. These transactions are called "securitizations" because through these transactions the SPE's investors obtain securities that evidence their interest in the SPE, and hence in its assets. Prior to the transaction, interest in the assets was evidenced by the firm's ownership of the assets. The SPE is "special purpose"
because it typically has no activities other than those associated with the transferred assets. Also, because the SPE typically holds only those assets transferred to it in the securitization, the firm's interest in the SPE is referred to as the firm's "retained interest" in the transferred assets. potentially knows more about its borrowers and has more experience in assessing and mitigating credit risk than do the investors in the SPE.
Accounting for Asset Securitizations
The financial reporting for asset securitization transactions is controversial. Under financial reporting standards presently in effect, the key question is whether the securitizing firm has sold the securitized assets, or has retained control of the assets and used them as collateral to borrow funds from the SPE's investors. If the essence of the transaction is the former, then the firm would no longer bear the risk associated with the securitized assets; the firm only would bear the risk inherent in its investment in the assets, i.e., its retained interest. In this case, the appropriate financial reporting treatment would be to derecognize the assets, recognize any gain or loss on the sale, and recognize the retained interest as an investment. If the essence of the transaction is the latter, then the firm would bear the risks associated with both its retained interest and the interest retained by the SPE. In this case, the appropriate financial reporting treatment would be to recognize the cash received from the SPE as a borrowing secured by the securitized assets.
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For a securitization transaction to be considered a sale of the transferred assets in accordance with U.S. GAAP, specified conditions must be met. During our sample period, these conditions are specified by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140 (SFAS 140, FASB, 2000) . SFAS 140 specifies that to be considered a sale, a transfer must meet all three of the following conditions. (1) The transferred assets must be isolated from the firm, i.e., put presumptively beyond the reach of the firm and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership. This is commonly referred to as the transferred assets being "legally isolated" or "bankruptcy remote" from the firm. (2) Each transferee must have the right to pledge or exchange the assets or beneficial interests it receives, without conditions or constraints. (3) The securitizing firm does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets through either an agreement to repurchase or redeem the assets before their maturity or the ability to unilaterally cause the holder to return specific assets, other than through a cleanup call.
To recognize an asset securitization as a sale in accordance with SFAS 140, the firm derecognizes the securitized assets, and recognizes the proceeds received from the SPE and the retained interest investment. To determine the gain or loss on sale of the non-retained interest and the amount of the retained interest investment, the firm allocates its carrying amount of the 2 Current accounting rules generally treat as a secured borrowing securitization transactions that result in the transfer of some, but not all, of the risk associated with the securitized assets. However, some believe that borrowing treatment does not faithfully represent the economics of such transactions. For example, the IASB's exposure draft of a standard on derecognition (IASB, 2009) offers an alternative approach to asset securitization accounting in which, rather than characterizing a securitization as a sale or a borrowing, the securitizing firm would derecognize the transferred assets and recognize as assets and liabilities all the rights and obligations either retained or obtained in the transfer, including forward contracts, puts, calls, guarantees, or disproportionate involvement with respect to the transferred cash flows.
securitized assets at the transfer date to the retained and non-retained portions based on their relative fair values at that date. Thus, the gain or loss on the sale of securitized assets equals the proceeds received minus the previous carrying amount of the securitized assets that is allocated to the non-retained portion of the assets. The amount the firm recognizes as retained interest equals the portion of previous carrying amount of the securitized assets allocated to the retained portion. 
Related Research
Much of the prior research on asset securitizations focuses on the equity market's assessment of the relation between securitized assets and the securitizing firm's equity value.
Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare (LPS, 2008) investigates whether equity investors perceive asset securitizations as asset sales or as secured borrowings. LPS reports that the equity market views securitized assets as belonging to the securitizing firm, i.e., the risk and rewards of ownership of the transferred assets reside with the firm. LPS concludes that equity investors perceive asset securitizations as secured borrowings. Niu and Richardson (2006) also presents evidence consistent the equity market viewing asset securitizations as secured borrowings. Niu and Richardson (2006) shows that securitized assets have the same relevance for explaining market measures of equity risk as do assets recognized on the statement of financial position.
Some prior research also analyzes the risk-relevance of asset securitizations by investigating the sources of equity risk induced by transfers of financial assets. Cheng, through higher informational costs. Consistent with this prediction, CDN finds banks that undertake securitizations have higher information uncertainty, i.e., higher bid-ask spreads and analyst forecast dispersion, compared to banks without such transactions, and that information uncertainty increases with the amount of the securitized assets.
The most closely related study to ours is Chen, Liu, and Ryan (CLR, 2008) , which explores sources of variation in equity risk associated with asset securitizations. In regression specifications similar to ours, which include both total securitized assets and the firm's retained interest, CLR finds that the association between equity return volatility and securitizations vary with the type of asset securitized. In particular, CLR finds significant positive relations between equity return volatility and (i) securitized assets and retained interest-only strips for residential mortgages; (ii) securitized assets, but not retained interest, for consumer loans; and (iii) retained interest-only strips, but not securitized assets, for commercial loans. These findings suggest that the equity market's assessment of the extent of the risk the firm bears differs for securitized assets with different characteristics.
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Our study also relates to the literature on the efficacy of credit ratings in reflecting timely and accurate assessments of credit risk. Prior literature suggests that when analyzing an association with credit risk, one needs to consider potential differences in the views of bondholders and credit rating agencies. This is because credit ratings reflect both credit risk and the incentives of the credit rating agencies. For example, Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman (2006) examines whether the properties of bond ratings issued by certified rating agencies differ from those issued by non-certified rating agencies, and generally finds that certified rating agencies issue more conservative ratings. Cheng and Neamtiu (CN, 2009) finds that the lack of timeliness of credit ratings is partly attributable to monopoly power enjoyed by credit rating agencies. CN also finds that credit rating agencies improve accuracy and timeliness and reduce variance of their ratings after high profile bankruptcies, e.g., Enron, and negative investor and regulatory attention.
Credit rating agencies state that when assessing credit risk for non-financial firms they adjust information in financial statements to treat asset securitizations as borrowings (Standard and Poor's, 2006; Moody's, 2006) . Kraft (2009) explains that the agencies make two types of adjustments, "hard," i.e., quantitative, and "soft," i.e., qualitative. Consistent with the agencies'
statements, for a sample of non-financial firms Kraft (2009) finds that "hard" adjustments often involve treating asset securitizations as borrowings. However, Kraft (2010) finds that rating agencies' cater to firms using ratings in debt contracts and provides evidence that, for such firms, "hard" adjustments are essentially reversed by "soft" adjustments. This is consistent with rating agencies' incentives affecting their ratings.
Credit rating agencies incentives also have been questioned in connection with the current financial crisis. Some have alleged that the agencies issued higher credit ratings than were justified based on the firms' credit risk. These higher ratings provided firms the opportunity to obtain additional financing at lower cost, much of which was used to fund offbalance sheet activities, e.g., asset securitizations (e.g., Rosenkranz, 2009; Sorkin, 2009; Morgenson and Story, 2010) . 5 In response to the potential role the effects of rating agency incentives played in exacerbating the financial crisis, in June 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed rules designed to mitigate rating agency conflicts of interest (SEC, 2008a) . In December 2008, the SEC approved measures to strengthen oversight of credit rating agencies (SEC, 2008b) .
We extend the prior literature in three respects. First, we determine whether securitizations are associated with credit risk and investigate the sources of this credit risk.
6 Second, we determine whether different credit market participants have different perceptions of the sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations, and whether these perceptions suggest they view asset securitizations as sales or as borrowings. Third, we provide evidence on the allegation that rating agencies were not diligent in assessing the effects of "off-balance sheet" activities on credit risk.
Empirical Predictions and Research Design
We focus on asset securitizations of bank holding companies because they are the primary securitizers of assets (Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare, 2010) . Because securitizations are accounted for as sales and, thus, the securitized assets are not recognized in the statement of financial position, i.e., securitizations are "off-balance sheet" activities, data for a large sample of firms with securitizations are difficult to obtain. Perhaps reflecting this, some prior research on 5 Prior to the crisis, AIG and Lehman Brothers had AAA and AA ratings, respectively, despite their greater than 30-to-1 leverage after taking into account off balance sheet debt (Sorkin, 2009 ). In addition, rating agencies allegedly provided banks with access to the computer models used to determine their ratings (Morgenson and Story, 2010) . 6 The association between asset securitizations and credit risk can differ from the association between asset securitizations and equity risk, and thus cannot be inferred from prior research on equity risk. In particular, prior research indicates that risk can have different or opposite effects on the cost of equity and the cost of debt because of the conflict of interest between equityholders and debtholders. For example, although Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) finds that insider ownership can increase risk to debtholders, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2009) finds that insider ownership reduces agency risks to shareholders.
securitizations typically relies on hand-collected data for a relatively small sample (e.g., Dechow and Shakespeare, 2008; Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare, 2008; Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare, 2010) . In contrast, other studies, as do we, focus on banks and use data on securitizations contained in the Federal Reserve's Bank Regulatory database (e.g., Chen, Liu, and Ryan, 2008; Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Neamtiu, 2008) . This database contains detailed quarterly financial statement and asset securitization information obtained from the Y-9C reports that all bank holding companies with consolidated assets in excess of $150 million must file with the Federal Reserve. Thus, focusing on banks provides us the opportunity to offer evidence on the relation between credit risk and asset securitizations for a relatively large and economically important sample of firms.
We test whether credit market participants view the risk associated with securitized assets as credit risk of the bank using a research design similar to Chen, Liu, and Ryan (2008) . In particular, we estimate the relation between measures of credit risk and securitized assets, the bank's retained interest, and control variables. We use two measures of credit risk: the bank's credit rating and the interest rate spread on the bank's bonds. Credit ratings are determined by a rating agency and represent the agency's assessment of the bank's credit risk. As a result, credit ratings can reflect rating agencies' private information, but can be influenced by factors other than the credit risk of the bank, such as the rating agency's incentives for issuing particular ratings. Thus, our tests of an association between credit ratings and asset securitizations are joint tests of a relation between credit risk and asset securitizations, and unbiased, timely credit ratings. In contrast, bond spreads are determined by the bond market and represent an estimate of credit risk aggregated across bond-market participants. Thus, bond spreads reflect publicly available information about asset securitizations, which might be incomplete, but likely are not influenced by credit rating agency incentives. Thus, our tests of an association between bond spreads and asset securitizations are joint tests of a relation between credit risk and asset securitizations and bond-market efficiency.
Given the controversy surrounding whether credit ratings appropriately reflect banks' credit risk associated with asset securitizations, we begin our analysis by examining the relation between credit ratings and asset securitizations. If one's priors are that the bond market is more efficient and unbiased than credit rating agencies, as credit agency critics suggest, then by next examining the relation between bond spreads and asset securitizations we can provide insight into the efficacy of credit rating agency assessments of credit risk.
Credit Ratings
We first estimate the relation between securitizations and credit ratings. In particular, we estimate: (1), which are measured for quarter t, are available to the rating agency when developing its credit rating.
Securitized is securitized assets and Retained is retained interest, both measured at the end of the quarter and scaled by adjusted total assets. Adjusted total assets is total assets minus retained interest. Throughout our analyses, we adjust total assets to exclude retained interest because retained interest is a focus of our tests.
Regarding control variables, Size is the natural logarithm of adjusted total assets;
Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the previous 60 months; ROA is net income scaled by adjusted total assets; and Leverage is total liabilities scaled by adjusted total assets (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006) . 7 Because our sample comprises bank holding companies, in addition to control variables used in prior research we include several variables as controls for the risk of bank operations. In particular, LiquidAssets is the sum of cash, available-for-sale securities, trading assets, federal funds sold, and securities held with intent to resell; Loans is total customer loans outstanding; CreditDeriv is the notional amount of credit derivatives; and IntDeriv is the notional amount of interest rate derivatives; all scaled by adjusted total assets. SecInc is securitization income scaled by securitized assets. 8 We focus our inferences on the signs and significance of the coefficients on Securitized and Retained, δ 1 and δ 2 . If rating agencies perceive that the bank bears credit risk associated with the retained and non-retained portions of securitized assets, then we predict δ 1 is positive. If 7 Regarding Leverage, deposit liabilities of banks may differ from other liabilities in their relation to credit risk. However, defining Leverage without including deposit liabilities and including deposits as an additional explanatory variable and interacted with Securitized and Retained does not affect our inferences. Regarding Size, it is possible that rating agency incentives differ for large and small banks. However, our inferences also are unaffected by estimating equation (1) after interacting Securitized and Retained with Size and, alternatively, permitting the coefficients in equation (1) to differ for large and small banks, where large and small is defined based on the median of Size. 8 In untabulated estimations of equation (1), and equations (2) through (4), following Chen, Liu, and Ryan (2008), we also include as additional explanatory variables the percentage growth in managed assets; the absolute value of the difference between book values of assets and liabilities expected to reprice within the following year, trading income, servicing fee plus securitization income, and the sum of available-for-sale and held-to-maturity securities minus retained interest, all scaled by adjusted total assets; net charge-offs of securitized loans and past due securitized loans scaled by securitized assets; and the bank's Tier 1 and Tier 2 risk-based capital ratio. We do not tabulate the findings because they reveal that these variables neither add significant explanatory power to our estimation equations nor affect our inferences. Untabulated findings also reveal that our inferences are unaffected by including the following additional explanatory variables: indicator variables for whether the bank has subordinated debt, negative earnings, or non-zero securitized assets (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006) ; the bank's equity book-to-market ratio and equity market value; and quarter fixed effects. Untabulated findings also reveal that our inferences are unaffected if we scale variables by unadjusted total assets, define ROA as return on non-securitization assets, and define Retained as the natural logarithm of the bank's retained interest.
rating agencies perceive the retained and non-retained portions as equally relevant for assessing risk, then, in addition, we predict δ 2 is zero. In contrast, if rating agencies perceive that the bank does not bear the risk of the securitized assets and only bears risk associated with its retained interest, then we predict δ 2 is positive and δ 1 is zero.
Regarding the control variables, following prior research (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006), we expect firms that are larger and more profitable to be less risky and firms with greater return volatility and more leverage to be more risky. Although we expect that liquid assets are less risky than non-liquid assets, we have no expectation for how securities differ in liquidity from other liquid assets. Because consumer loans are revenue generating, we expect they are less risky than other types of assets. Because credit and interest rate derivatives can be used to increase or decrease risk, it is an empirical question whether credit rating agencies view these derivatives as associated with higher or lower credit risk. Because securitizations are more likely to occur the more profitable are such transactions, we include securitization income as a control for cross-sectional differences in the rate of return on securitized assets, but do not have an expectation for the sign of its coefficient. We expect that more charge-offs of and past due securitized assets are associated with higher risk. As a result, we expect δ 3 , δ 5 , δ 7 , and δ 8 are negative, and δ 4 and δ 6 are positive; we have no expectation for the signs of δ 9 , δ 10 , and δ 11 .
As noted in section 3, prior research finds that the association between asset securitizations and equity risk varies by the type of asset securitized. To test whether rating agencies' assessment of risk associated with asset securitization also varies by type of asset securitized, we follow Chen, Liu, and Ryan (2008) and partition securitized assets into three categories: residential mortgages, consumer loans, and commercial loans. We estimate an expanded version of equation (1) Our predictions for the coefficients in equation (2) parallel those for the coefficients in equation (1). In particular, if rating agencies perceive that the bank bears risk associated with the retained and non-retained portions of securitized assets regardless of the type of asset securitized, then we predict δ 1 , δ 2 , and δ 3 are positive. If rating agencies perceive the retained and nonretained portions as equally relevant for assessing risk, then, in addition, we predict δ 4 , δ 5 , and δ 6 are zero. In contrast, if rating agencies perceive that the bank does not bear the risk of the securitized assets and only bears risk associated with its retained interest, then we predict δ 4 , δ 5 , and δ 6 are positive and δ 1 , δ 2 , and δ 3 are zero.
We estimate equations (1) and (2) using ordered logit regression because Rating is a categorical variable. To correct for time-series and cross-sectional dependence, in all of our estimation equations we report t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm and quarter (e.g., Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2010).
Bond Spread
We next estimate the relation between the bank's quarterly bond spreads and securitization assets. Specifically, we estimate: 
where Spread t+1 is the annualized bond yield for quarter t + 1 less the risk-free rate. As with the credit rating analyses, we use Spread for quarter t + 1 as the dependent variable to ensure that information relating to all of the variables of interest in equation (3), which are measured for quarter t, are available to the bond market when assessing the bond spread. 9 Consistent with
Rating, higher values of Spread correspond to greater credit risk.
Regarding control variables, in addition to the variables included in equations (1) and (2), we include bond-level control variables in equation (3) because bond spread is determined by characteristics of the bond. In particular, we include Maturity, which is the time to maturity for the bond, and Coupon, which is the coupon rate of the bond (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2004, AMR) . If a firm has multiple bonds, we measure Spread, Maturity, and Coupon as the averages of the spread, maturity, and coupon for each of the bank's bonds, weighted by bond price (e.g., AMR). 10 Following prior research (e.g., AMR), we expect longer maturity bonds and bonds with larger coupon payments to be more risky and, thus, expect δ 3 and δ 4 are positive.
9 One potential concern with using bond spreads is whether bond markets are sufficiently liquid to reflect information in a timely manner. Consistent with timely changes in bond spreads, untabulated statistics reveal that Spread t differs from Spread t+1 for every observation in our sample. 10 Untabulated findings reveal that our inferences are unaffected if we (i) conduct our bond spread tests using bondlevel rather than bank-level estimation equations; (ii) construct the bank-level variables by equally weighting the characteristics of the individual bonds rather than by bond price; (iii) define spread based on semiannual yields rather than annual yields; (iv) construct spread as the yield relative to a comparable security rather than the risk-free rate; and (v) include quarter fixed effects.
Our expectations regarding the signs of the coefficients on the other control variables are the same as in equation (1).
We also estimate equation (4) 
Our predictions regarding the signs of the coefficients on the disaggregated securitization variables are the same as in equation (2). Controls is the vector of control variables from equation (3) and our expectations for the signs of their coefficients are the same as in equation (3).
Sample and Data
We obtain data from Bank Regulatory, 
Results
Credit Ratings
12 Our bond spread sample comprises bank-quarter observations with bond spreads and credit ratings. Relaxing the credit rating requirement would result in 24 more observations for the bond spread analyses from three banks. Including these additional observations does not alter our inferences. 13 Instead defining Securitizers as bank-quarter observations with non-zero securitized assets results in 804 (552) observations for the Rating (Spread) specifications, with no change in our inferences. 14 Untabulated statistics reveal that the sample period witnessed a substantial increase in securitization activity. Total securitized assets, in total for all sample banks, increased from $2.6 trillion to $7.0 trillion and the mean of securitized assets, across sample banks, increased from $14.6 billion to $27.6 billion. Generally, the increase occurs across sample years, except for 2003-and to a lesser extent 2004-when the amounts decreased somewhat. However, the mean percentage of banks' securitized assets to adjusted total assets decreased somewhat from 15.2% in 2001 to 11.0% in 2006. 15 Panel B reveals that the Pearson correlation between securitized assets, Securitized, and Rating is positive, 0.07, but the Spearman correlation is negative, -0.19. However, untabulated statistics reveal that neither correlation is significantly different from zero. Untabulated statistics also reveal that these correlations are negative and insignificantly different from zero for All Banks and for the subsample with non-missing Spread. Regardless, we base our inferences on the multivariate relations specified in equations (1) through (4). Regarding securitized assets, the first and second set of columns reveal that, for both Securitizers and All Banks, the coefficient on Securitized is not significantly different from zero (t-stats. = -0.92 and -1.03, respectively) and that on Retained is significantly positive (t-stats. = 1.83 and 1.97, respectively). 18 This combination of findings indicates that credit risk as reflected 16 Including in the analysis banks that have zero securitized assets allows us to avoid concerns about sample selection that would arise if we included only those banks that have non-zero securitized assets. 17 We consider t-statistics greater than 1.65 (1.96) in absolute value as indicating significance for one-sided (two sided) tests. 18 Table 1 , panel B, reveals a high positive correlation between Securitized and Retained (Pearson = 0.57, Spearman = 0.69). However, untabulated findings reveal that our inferences relating to these two variables are unchanged if the other variable is omitted from our estimating equations. For example relating to equation (1), untabulated findings reveal that the coefficient on Retained (Securitized) is significantly positive (insignificantly different from zero) regardless of whether Securitized (Retained) is included in the estimating equation. In addition, finding a significantly positive coefficient on Retained and an insignificant coefficient on Securitized indicates the coefficient on the non-retained interest is not significantly different from zero. To test this directly, we reestimated equation (1) substituting non-retained interest, i.e., Securitized -Retained, for Securitized. The untabulated findings reveal, as expected, that the coefficient on Retained is significantly positive (t-stats. = 3.11 and 2.33 for All Banks and in credit ratings is associated with the banks' retained interest in securitized assets, but not with the non-retained interest. Thus, these findings are consistent with the rating agency viewing asset securitizations as sales. That is, credit rating agencies view the firm as bearing no risk of the non-retained assets.
The significance of the coefficients on the control variables is virtually the same after including Securitized and Retained. Additionally, the coefficient on SecInc is not significantly different from zero for either Securitizers or All Banks (t-stats. = 0.63 and 0.60, respectively), which indicates that return on securitized assets is not associated with credit risk. This could be the case either because SecInc has no relation to risk or because the amount of securitization income has been the subject of earnings management, which results in a noisy measure of securitization income. 19 That we only find a significant relation between credit ratings and asset securitizations for one type of asset supports critics' allegations that rating agencies largely ignore securitized assets when developing banks' credit ratings. If one assumes bond markets are efficient, examining the relation between bond spreads and asset securitizations can provide insight into whether credit rating agencies largely ignore securitized assets for good reason. Chen, Liu, and Ryan (CLR, 2008) finds that aggregate retained mortgage interest is not significantly associated with equity risk in a specification analogous to our equation (2). However, CLR also partitions mortgage retained interest into interest-only strips and other subordinated interests and finds that retained mortgage interest-only strips is significantly positively related to equity risk but other subordinated mortgage retained interests is not. Relating to Rating, untabulated findings from estimating equation (2) but partitioning mortgage retained interest into these two categories reveal that our table 3 findings apply to both in that both are significantly positively related to credit ratings. For All Banks (Securitizers) the t-statistics are 4.47 (3.78) for retained mortgage interest-only strips and 1.75 (2.13) for other subordinated mortgage retained interest. Relating to Spread, untabulated findings from estimating equation (4) = -0.17 and 0.70, and -1.54 and -0.04, respectively).
Bond Spreads
More importantly for our research question, the findings relating to securitized assets in first and second set of columns are strikingly different from those in table 2. In particular, for both Securitizers and All Banks, the coefficient on The ordering of the coefficient in this manner is consistent with prior equity market research, which documents that residential mortgages having the least risk, consumer loans the second least, and commercial loans the most (e.g., Chen, Liu, and Ryan, 2008) . Taken together, the results suggest the bond market perceives, regardless of the type of asset securitized, that banks bear the risk associated with the securitized assets.
Sensitivity Analyses
BOND SPREADS
An alternative explanation for our finding a positive relation between securitized assets and bond spreads is that, rather than greater securitization activity being associated with higher bond spreads, banks with higher bond spreads are those that securitize more assets. That is, the cost of debt at the beginning of period t affects the bank's securitization activity in period t, such that a relation between securitization assets and cost of debt at the end of period t results from failure to control for the firm's contemporaneous cost of debt. This issue is inherent in research on credit risk and is not unique to our setting (e.g., Weber, 2006) . In an attempt to rule out this alternative explanation for our findings, our primary tests use as the dependent variable bond spread for the quarter after the quarter in which we measure securitization assets, i.e., we use bond spread for quarter t + 1, which ensures the bond market knows about the securitizations up to and including those of period t.
In addition, we follow the suggestion in Weber (2006) and Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Neamtiu (2008) and include Spread t , i.e., bond spread measured contemporaneously with securitization assets, as an additional explanatory variable in equations (3) and (4) as a control for the bank's existing cost of debt. 21 We expect a positive coefficient on Spread t . If our findings are robust to including this control for the bank's existing credit risk, then we expect the signs of the coefficients on the remaining variables to be the same as in equations (3) and (4). Table 6 , panel A, presents the findings and reveals that our inferences relating to securitized assets and retained interest are robust to including Spread t in the estimating equation.
For parsimony we report results only for Securitizers. 22 The coefficient on Securitized is significantly positive (t-stat. = 3.54) and that on Retained is not significantly different from zero (t-stat. = 0.95). Relating to the disaggregated securitization assets specification, the coefficients on all three securitized asset variables are significantly positive (t-stats. = 3.19, 2.23, and 2.41).
In addition, the ordering of coefficient magnitudes on these variables is the same as in table 5.
Panel A also reveals that none of the coefficients on the three retained interest variables is significantly different from zero.
Because credit ratings are available to bond market participants, we next estimate equations (3) and (4) including credit ratings measured contemporaneously with the securitization variables, Rating t , as an additional explanatory variable. In untabulated analyses we also estimate specifications of equations (1) and (2) analogous to those in table 6, panel A. That is, we include credit ratings measured contemporaneously with the securitization variables, Rating t , as an additional explanatory variable. Because credit ratings change with a lag (e.g., Pinches and Singleton, 1978) , we anticipate these tests to be lower power than those presented in tables 2 and 3. 24 We find the coefficient on Rating t is significantly positive in all specifications and inferences relating to securitization assets and retained interest that generally are consistent with those in tables 2 and 3. In particular, regarding securitized assets, none of the coefficients on Securitized is significantly different from zero (t-stats. range from -1.41 to 1.09). Regarding retained interest, the coefficient on Retained is not significantly different from zero (t-stat. = 1.20) and neither are the coefficients on RetainedMortgage, RetainedConsumer, and RetainedCommercial (t-stats. range from -1.18 to 0.84). 23 We also estimated a version of equation (3) (1) and (2) using, sequentially, Rating t+2 and Rating t+3 as the dependent variable, with no change in our inferences.
Data availability leads us to estimate the Rating equations (1) and (2) using a larger sample than we use to estimate the Spread equations (3) and (4). We do so to maximize the power of our Rating tests. However, using different samples for the two sets of tests raises the possibility that the differences in our Rating and Spread findings are attributable to differences in sample composition. Thus, in untabulated analysis we estimate equations (1) and (2) based on the Spread sample. Consistent with the findings in table 2, panel A, we find that for All Banks the coefficient on Retained is significantly positive and the coefficient on Securitized is not significantly different from zero (t-stats. = 1.85 and -1.00). However, in the remaining specifications, perhaps because of reduced power, none of the coefficients on securitized assets or retained interest is significantly different from zero. These results provide corroborative evidence that credit ratings largely are unassociated with bank asset securitizations.
MATCHED SAMPLE
As an additional test, following Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010) , we use the Derigs (1988) propensity score matching algorithm to match firms based on Securitized. We form one-to-one matched pairs by estimating a propensity score as a function of the control variables and then minimizing propensity score differences between sample firms (see Armstrong Jagolinzer and Larcker, 2010 for more details). Propensity score matching, among other things, acts as a control for potential interactions or non-linearities in the relation between our dependent variables, i.e., Rating or Spread, and the control variables that might confound our inferences. Based on 857 firms in the All Bank sample with non-missing Spread, the matching algorithm results in a sample of 428 matched pairs. for the test of difference in means, medians, and distributions, respectively). Collectively, the findings from the propensity score matched sample are similar to those in tables 2 and 4.
Conclusion
This study examines the sources of credit risk associated with asset securitizations and whether credit rating agencies and the bond market differ in their perceptions of this risk. Our inferences are based on estimating the relation between credit risk and total securitized assets, the firm's retained interest in those assets, and control variables, using two measures of credit risk-credit ratings and bond spreads.
Using credit ratings as the measure of credit risk, we find no relation between credit risk and total securitized assets and a positive incremental relation between credit risk and the firm's retained interest. These findings indicate rating agencies perceive that the firm does not bear the risk of the securitized assets and only bears the risk of its retained interest. Such a finding is consistent with rating agencies viewing securitizations as asset sales. However, the positive relation between credit risk, measured using credit ratings, and the firm's retained interest is attributable to only one type of securitized assets-residential mortgages-not to retained interests in securitized consumer or commercial loans. Finding a relation between credit ratings and asset securitizations for only one type of asset supports critics' allegations that rating agencies largely ignore asset securitizations when developing banks' credit ratings.
In contrast, using bond spreads as the measure of credit risk, we find a positive relation between credit risk and total securitized assets. This finding indicates that the bond market views both the retained and non-retained portions of the securitized assets as relevant to the firm's credit risk. We find no incremental relation for the firm's retained interest, which
indicates that the bond market does not distinguish between the risk of the retained and nonretained portion of the securitized assets . Our bond spread findings apply regardless of the type of securitized asset-residential mortgages, consumer loans, and commercial loans. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the bond market viewing asset securitizations as borrowings.
If one's priors result in placing more weight on the bond market evidence, then our findings call into question not only the appropriateness of treating asset securitizations as sales, but also the diligence of credit rating agencies in assessing the credit risk of banks' off-balance sheet activities. The Accounting Review 83 (5), 1251.
Appendix. Variable definitions
Dependent variables
Rating S&P Credit Rating, which ranges from 1 to 21, with high values corresponding to lower credit ratings.
Spread
Annualized corporate bond yield less the risk-free rate. If a firm has multiple bonds, the yield of each bond is weighted by bond price.
Experimental variables
Securitized Securitized assets as a fraction of adjusted total assets Retained Retained interest in securitizations as a fraction of adjusted total assets
Control variables
Maturity
Time to maturity, measured in years. If a firm has multiple bonds, the time to maturity of each bond is weighted by bond price.
Coupon
Coupon rate. If a firm has multiple bonds, the coupon rate of each bond is weighted by bond price. Size Natural logarithm of adjusted total assets Volatility Volatility of monthly returns over the previous 60 months ROA Return on assets; net income scaled by adjusted total assets Leverage Total liabilities divided by adjusted total assets LiquidAssets Sum of cash, available-for-sale securities, trading assets, federal funds sold, and securities purchased with intent to resell, scaled by adjusted total assets Loans Total loans scaled by adjusted total assets CreditDeriv Notional amount of credit derivatives scaled by adjusted total assets IntDeriv Notional amount of interest rate derivatives scaled by adjusted total assets SecInc Return on securitized assets. Net income from securitizations scaled by securitized assets.
"adjusted total assets" refers to total assets reported on the statement of financial position minus retained interest. 
